While cryptocurrencies and blockchain applications continue to gain popularity, their energy cost is evidently becoming unsustainable. In most instances, the main cost comes from the required amount of energy for the Proof-of-Work, and this cost is inherent to the design. In addition, useless costs from discarded work (e.g., the so-called Forks) and lack of scalability (in number of users and in rapid transactions) limit their practical effectiveness. In this paper, we present an innovative scheme which eliminates the nonce and thus the burden of the Proof-of-Work which is the main cause of the energy waste in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. We prove that our scheme guarantees a tunable and bounded average number of simultaneous mining whatever the size of the population in competition, thus by making the use of nonce-based techniques unnecessary, achieves scalability without the cost of consuming a large volume of energy. The technique used in the proof of our scheme is based on the analogy of the analysis of a green leader election. The additional difference with Proof-of-Work schemes (beyond the suppression of the nonce field that is triggering most of the waste), is the introduction of "empty blocks" which aim are to call regular blocks following a staircase set of values. Our scheme reduces the risk of Forks and provides tunable scalability for the number of users and the speed of block generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Popular cryptocurrencies have now been effectively in use for more than ten years (e.g. Bitcoin [15] ). In addition to the increasing appetite for its key financial aspects (e.g., fast, transparent, secure and private), their potential to facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of various transactions provides an important innovative service that will have a disruptive impact for many applications. One drawback of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is the moderation of block mining rate. With mining reward as a tool in the control of volume of values, there is a fierce competition in block mining. In order to avoid that too many simultaneous blocks are mined and proposed for commitment, Bitcoin requires a "proof of work" by forcing the block miner to execute a large number of CPU cycles via iterated hash computations before submitting his/her block. The idea of computational puzzle as proof of work is not new, it appears first in the seminal work of Dwork and Noar [9] and was later suggested to avoid Sybil attack by Aspnes et al. [2] . The proof of work provides scarcity and uniqueness that help reduce the individual block mining rate.
However the "Proof of Work" (PoW) presently costs 100,000,000,000 CPU cycles (around 10 minutes on a current PC) and if one million miners contend at the same time, then the energy cost of mining one Bitcoin exceeds the value of the Bitcoin itself [16] . Furthermore this cost is expected to grow with the number of contending miners leading to a protocol whose energy cost can absolutely not be sustainable in the near future.
In order to avoid these catastrophic consequences, a plethora of alternatives have been suggested and analysed (e.g. [10] , [11] ), including variants of proofs of stake (e.g., [6] , [20] ) or various proofs of "something" (e.g., proof of Exercise [19] ). Other attempts to tackle the huge waste generated by the Proof of Work as implemented in Bitcoin have been aiming at turning them into work that is actually useful: e.g., solving practical problems have been investigated in [3] , extended to present PoWs that are based on the Orthogonal Vectors, 3SUM, and All-Pairs Shortest Path problems in [4] , [5] , and can be used to allow for much quicker verification and zeroknowledge PoWs. Yet it is unclear how this creates incentives for large amount of transactions, and how it guarantees Liveness (and in particular freedom from starvation if no one volunteers to solve a practical problem).
In this paper, we focus on the unsustainable energy cost and propose a cryptocurrency protocol moderated through a "green" mining protocol in such a way that it will remove the prohibitive energy cost of the proof of work while keeping the blockchain mining input rate between reasonable limits. Those limits can be arbitrarily tuned a priori, while the proof of work CPU parameter must be constantly updated.
Our validation of this scheme is inspired by "green" leader elections [13] , [14] . At its core our model implements a scheme which guarantees a tunable and bounded average number of simultaneous mining whatever the size of the population in competition, like a Leader Election. In addition to public verifiability, our scheme provides liveness and fairness: the unique chain grows and the probability of electing each party is independent to its relative computational power. Our model is "permissionless": there is no explicit membership protocol, anyone can join the system. Our model also offers the safety property (blocks are eventually committed and cannot be removed). Finally our scheme reduces the risk of Forks (divergent chains of blocks that need to be eventually discarded) and provides tunable scalability for the number of users and the speed of block generation.
The exact contribution of our work and the structure of the paper are as follows. We introduce our green blockchain protocol in Section II. Our protocol uses a block generation scheme that does not use a nonce. The novelty of our protocol comes from a call field that regulates the rate of creation of transaction blocks, in addition to empty blocks. We prove the performance analysis of our protocol in Section III. The methodology of the proof follows a distributed leader election via collision scheme that has an interest on its own. The technique guarantees a tunable and bounded average number of simultaneous mining, whatever the size of the population in competition for block generation, thus offering full scalability. In section IV we present a protocol for implicit empty blocks that renders the scheme completely distributed, tunable and scalable. As the scheme also reduces the chances of forks, it further reduces the energy waste. We provide the performance analysis of the implicit empty block scheme.
II. THE GREEN COIN MINING PROTOCOL A. Parameters and format
Our Green Coin protocol is based on the following parameters:
• an integer k; • a vector of increasing probabilities of length k + 1: P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P k , with P k = 1; • an upper bound N on the maximum admissible number of contending blocks, that can be set as large as possible. Typical values for these parameters would be k = 8, N = 2 32 . The green coin leader protocol consists in authorizing the mining of an average number of order N 1/k out of n ≤ N contending blocks.
As per Bitcoin, each block of the Green Coin protocol will carry some values obtained by hash function. We denote h the length of the hash value fields in the block. A typical value is h = 256 (32 bytes). Whilst Bitcoin has only one kind of block, Green Coin relies on two kinds of blocks:
• the regular block containing transactions; • the empty block which does not contain any transactions. The regular block format is similar to Bitcoin block format but with the difference that it does not contain a nonce field but instead a call field. The call field dictates the required criteria for the next hash value field. The following table gives an abstract format listing the most significant fields: 1 hash of previous block 2 date 3 list of transactions ... ...
call value 5 hash of the block
The empty block looks similar but with no transaction list.
B. Mining protocol
Initially, to simplify our presentation, we will assume that empty slots are mined by a central entity and on a restricted block server. We will discuss later how the protocol can be made distributed or how to face forgery.
A block can be mined only if its hash value is smaller than the call value of the previous block. The call field of a regular block has always the same value which is 2 h+1 P 0 − 1. If no regular block is mined, after a certain lapse of time the central entity mines an empty block. Unlike regular block hash values, an empty block hash value does not need to be smaller than the call value of the previous block. The call value of the first empty block should have value 2 h+1 P 1 −1.
As long as no new regular block is mined, the central entity mines empty block with successive call values 2 h+1 P 2 − 1, . . . , 2 h+1 P k − 1. After k mined empty blocks the call values sequence restarts.
There are three facts worth noting: (i) as there is no nonce field in the regular block there is no proof of work computation required, (ii) instead, the blocks are authorized via the call values which have the effect of regulating the mining rate, (iii) the non-authorized blocks do not need to be submitted and this limits also the traffic generated by the block mining.
Liveness. If a call fails, i.e. no regular block is mined, then a new call will be made via a new empty block. Since P k = 1, the last call value is the max-value 2 h+1 − 1. Therefore any competition of block mining will result in at least one block mined. Figure 1 displays an example of block sequences in the blockchain. The chain is enforced by the hash values Y 0 , Y 1 , . . . The value of a regular block hash should always be smaller than the call value of the previous block, regardless it is empty or regular. Empty blocks do not need to follow this rule. 
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS USING LEADER ELECTION

A. Analogy of a classic leader election via collision
Let us introduce a game of leader election to analyse the performance of our protocol and its scalability. The goal of leader election (e.g., [12] , [18] ) is to select one among n > 0 players, by proceeding through a number of rounds. Note that using rounds is also commonly accepted that the Blockchain model incorporates some degree of synchrony assumptions: in a network with unbounded delay, the adversary can boost its power just by making the non-faulty parties incur higher delays (e.g., [8] ). We will show that these assumptions are actually unnecessary for our complete scheme in Section IV.
Informally, the rounds of our leader election are made via coin tossing. We assume that each competitor has a coin whose head probability is p and tail probability q = 1−p. We want to proceed to a leader election among n ≥ 1 competitors. At the beginning all the n competitors transmit. If this results into a collision then each competitor tosses the coin, only those who get a head contend for the second round, we call them the survivors. If the second round results in a collision, then a second coin tossing occurs and a subset of survivors contend, and the protocol continues until none survive. In this case we take as result the last non empty set of survivors.
Usually there is an additional procedure in order to reduce the survivor population to a single leader using a collision algorithm. In our case, this is not necessary as long as the subset of survivor is of reasonable size: we will prove using analytic combinatorics that the average size of the last non empty survivor set is q p log(1/p) with some fluctuations of small amplitude. Note that this value is finite and independent of the initial number contenders. This average size can also be tuned to be small or large by tuning the parameter p. This can be done by compromising with the average number of rounds which tends to log 1/p n when n → ∞.
If we wanted to imitate this process for the call values in the empty block, we will need a sequence (P 0 , P 1 , . . .) such that P = p represents an exponential descending staircase but this will create the case that after the first call one would have already n mined blocks. However we can use our protocol to create the ascending exponential staircase effect when there is a large yet fixed limit N to the number of simultaneous contenders. In this case we suppose that P 0 = 1 N and that P = 1 N p − for ≤ k. In order to have P k = 1 one must have p = 1 N 1/k . If N = 2 32 and k = 8 we will have p = 1 16 and the call sequence will be: call value rank Probability sequence call value
We denote M n the average number of regular mined block when n blocks are in competition after a regular block. Note that an important yet regular assumption in this paper is that successive calls of a hashing function are independent. Of course stricto sensu this is not true since hash value determinations are deterministic computations, but traditionally the better successive hash values imitates independent random variables, the better is a hash function. In fact this argument is the foundation for accepting the resilience of blockchains (made of successive hash computations) against attacks.
Let M n denote the number of blocks mined after the th empty block under the condition that all the previous empty blocks resulted into no regular block mined. We have M n = M 0 n and since P k = 1: M k n = n. Since the fact that the successive calls to hash values are assumed independent, the number of blocks called by the th empty block is a binomial random variable B(n, P ) of probability P . For < k when the binomial variable is B(n, P ) = 0 which occurs with probability (1 − P ) n , no block is mined after the th block and M n = M −1 n . Thus for all integers m, m > 0:
and P (M n = 0) = δ(n).
where δ(n) = 1 if n = 0 and zero otherwise.
and M k n (u) = u n . Proof: This is a direct application of Equation (1).
Lemma 2.
We have the identity
Proof: This is a direct application of previous lemma by using E[u M n ] = ∂ ∂u M n (1) Theorem 1. For all n ≤ N , we have the estimate
Remark: the optimal value is k = O(log N ) but lower values are also interesting.
Proof: From Equation 3 we get the inequalities This quantity is smaller than f (n/N ) with f (x) = 1 p ∈Z g(p x) with g(x) = xe −x . The function f (e x ) is periodic of period log p and therefore is bounded.
Since p = N −1/k , n/N ≤ 1 and n ≤ N , we get the result.
Theorem 2. We have the more precise estimate
with A = 1 log(1/p) k∈Z |Γ (1 + 2ikπ/ log p)|, p denoting N −1/k and where Γ(.) is the Euler "Gamma" function.
Proof: We can give an accurate estimate of the maximum value of function f (x). The function f (e x ) is periodic of period log p and therefore has a Fourier decomposition:
f (e x ) = k∈ g k e 2ikπx/ log p (5) where g k is the Fourier coefficient. 
and then use the upper bound |f (e x )| ≤ k∈Z |g k |.
In passing we get the mean value of f (e x ) to be equal to g 0 = 1 log(1/p) . Figure 2 shows the quantity E[M n ] versus n for various parameters. The sequence of bumps reflects the periodic fluctuations as function of log n analyzed in the upper bound. Figure 3 shows the same quantities obtained by simulation, each point being simulated 1,000 times. In fact, we can give a close expression of the distribution of M n .
Lemma 3. For all complex number u:
Proof: By application of Lemma 1. Figure 4 displays the various shape of the sequences P (M n > m) versus integer m for various parameters. Notice that the sequence of descending bumps in the plots comes from the mixture of the different binomial distributions. We can also give an estimate of the exponential tail distribution of M n by the following theorem about large deviations. Proof: We have P = p k− and
Let u = 1+p, we have 1+(u−1)p = 1+p +1 and therefore
Since (1 + p k+1 ) n ≤ exp(np k+1 ) = exp(pn/N ) and n < N we have exp(np/N ) ≤ exp(N −1/k ).
We conclude the proof with the observation that for all integer m: u m P (M n > m) ≤ E[u Mn ]. Figure 5 displays the histograms of 1,000 simulations of M n versus n for N = 2 32 and k = 8, 12, 16. The color of the point (n, m) indicates the number of times the event M n = m has been obtained during the simulation with the color code: black when more than 64 times, red when between 16 and 64, blue when between 4 and 16, green when between 1 and 4.
IV. DECENTRALIZED EMPTY BLOCK MINING
To make the empty block creation fully distributed, we extend our scheme in two steps (with the introduction of two features): (A) Time moderated empty blocks mining; (B) implicit empty blocks mining.
A. Time moderated empty block mining
Here all entities can mine empty blocks. To avoid unfairness between empty miners, a new empty block will be allowed only if its date is above a minimal gap time between the last full and empty block time. Comparing with other existing schemes, the Minimal Gap Time (MGT) can be set to one minute (e.g., in Bitcoin this is the Block Time, the average time between blocks, and the difficulty of the PoW is adjusted to make the time about 10 minutes; while the block time for Ethereum is set to between 14 and 15 seconds). Note that, in this case, we still need to have at least one entity mining empty blocks to guarantee liveness. Hence for this first variation we assume that possibly several (and at least one) peer-nodes generate empty blocks and thus play the role of a distributed timestamping and block servers.
Time can be captured using Unix universal time (POSIX), a widely used time-stamping system in Unix-like operating systems, that is commonly used for Blockchain systems. However, one difficulty is that the date given by the clock is not mandatorily accurate (e.g., Unix time is not a true representation of UTC, and leap seconds are not accounted for). However note we are only interested in the time difference in this part. One possibility is that an additional time stamp is added to the block in order to reflect the local time when the timestamping server received the block. Of course, since the timestamping server's time is local, it can only be added at the reception and will be excluded from the hash value computation of the block. An empty block received before the expiration of the minimum time gap with the local time of the timestamping server will be delayed. An empty block with a time stamp which does not show the MGT offset with the original time stamp of a full block will be discarded.
The date field of the empty blocks must be excluded from their hash value computation. Otherwise full blocks with different hash values could be called by different empty blocks on different peers just because the latter show different hash value due to different time stamps. Hence the sequence of hash values of the empty blocks mined after a full block will follow a deterministic sequence. If we ignore the clock drifts, the use of the time stamp does not change the performance analysis of the scheme as two consecutive calls to hash function generate independent hash values.
B. Implicit empty block mining
We can now extend the previous scheme by exploiting the fact that the sequence of hash values of the empty blocks mined after a full block will follow a deterministic sequence, and thus make them "implicit". In addition, and finally, we remove completely the requirement of any special or centralized entity and make the scheme fully distributed: one does not : various values of M n versus n simulated 1000 times black values appeared more than 64 times, red more than 16 times, blue more than 4 times, green more than once, with N = 2 32 , (left) for k = 8, (middle) k = 12, (right) k = 16.
need a special or central entity to initiate empty blocks since empty blocks will now become implicit, i.e. no empty blocks will be mined. The modification of the protocol is as follows: (i) Upon reception of a full block within less than one MGT after the mining of the last full block, a block server discards it; (ii) Upon reception of a full block within less than MGT (1 ≤ ≤ k) after the mining of the last full block, with either new block's hash value is larger than 2 h P −1 or the previous block hash value is not the hash value of the last full block, a block server discards it. Note that another advantage of this scheme is that it also minimises the risk of creating forks as full blocks are discarded earlier.
C. Performance analysis of the implicit empty block scheme
The main difference with the previous scheme analysis is that the hash value of the blocks after each empty block are no longer independent. In fact the hash value of a full block candidate is no longer possibly related to a new empty block. Indeed the previous block hash value field is no longer the hash value of the previous empty block, since it does no longer exists, but the hash value of the last full block. Keeping the previous notations we can state our main theorems and lemmas. 
We call slot the time interval of length MGT. Let assume that n full blocks are in competition. Let 0 < < k, the probability that a block has a hash value comprised between 2 h P −1 and 2 h P is P − P −1 . Such a block will be mined on the + 1-th slots after the last full block if and only if all the other full blocks in competition have their hash values greater than or equal to 2 h P . Those which have the hash value greater than 2 h P will not be mined. The hash values of the blocks being assumed independent justifies the binomial expression. The case = 0 corresponds to blocks which have value smaller than or equal to 2 h P 0 . In the case = k we have P k = 1 and occur when all the blocks have hash values greater than or equal to 2 h P k−1 Lemma 5. We have the expression: E[M n ] = nP 0 + k =1 n(P − P −1 )(1 − P −1 ) n−1 .
Proof: This is a direct expression of the previous lemma. We have E[M n ] = ∂ ∂u E[u Mn ]| u=1 . Indeed for u complex: m u m n m (P − P −1 ) m (1 − P −1 ) n−m = ((P − P −1 )u + 1 − P −1 ) n and the derivative of the right hand side with respect to variable u is equal to n(P − P −1 )((P − P −1 )u + 1 − P ) n−1 . We notice that when = k we have n(P − P −1 )(1 − P −1 ) n−1 = n(1 − P k−1 ) n since P k = 1.
The performance of the implicit empty blocks strategy are comparable to the performance of the explicit empty blocks. In fact we see that the plots of the average number of mined blocks oscillate and cross each other when we compare both strategy (see Figure 6 ). n(1/p − 1)P (1 − P −1 ) n (1 − P −1 )
The last right hand term is already proven to be O(N 1/k ) in the proof of Theorem 1.
Using the same reasoning, we obtain a more precise estimate via the use of the "Gamma" function: Thanks. This work was done when BM was visiting LINCS.
